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I. INTRODUCTION
Since its proposal in 2016, the Directive of the European Parliament and of
the Council on Copyright in the Digital Single Market ("the Directive" or "the
Copyright Directive") has been controversial. While the Directive was rooted in
good intentions, intended to "improv[e] the bargaining position ... and the
control rightsholders have on the use of their copyright-protected content" in
the digital space,' critics loudly proclaimed it as the death of the internet as we
know it. Notable architects and pioneers of the Internet, including Tim Berners-
Lee (inventor of the World Wide Web) and Jimmy Wales (founder of Wikipedia),
penned a letter to European Parliament addressing some of their concerns. 2 They
particularly highlighted the dangers posed from Article 13 of the Directive.
Article 13, at the time, suggested that websites bear the responsibility of
automatically filtering all of the content their users uploaded. Critics like Tim
Berners-Lee posited that this would not only contribute to the growing
atmosphere of surveillance on the web, but it would also place too large a burden
on the smaller internet platforms - to the advantage of larger companies like
Facebook, Google, and YouTube. 3
However, criticism of the Copyright Directive did not stop with Article 13.
Commentators also noted that Article 11 would have similar negative effects, but
on the spread of news and information around the web.4 Article 11 would require
online platforms to pay a "link tax" to publishers of information such as news
websites.5 This "link tax" had particular opposition from groups like Wikipedia
and GitHub, which rely on users to share not just news, but academic
information on their sites.6 While Article 11 was modified to provide that private,
non-commercial internet users would be exempt from such a tax, the ambiguous
language of Article 11, along with a failing history of similar implementations
across Europe, lead some to believe it could result in the manipulation of access
to news or even censorship.7
I Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Copyright in the Digital Single Market, at
9, COM (2016) 593 final (Sept. 14, 2016) [hereinafter Directive].
2 Letter from Vint Cerf et al. to Antonio Tajani MEP, President of European Parliament
(June 12, 2018) (on file with Electronic Frontier Foundation).
3 Id.
4 Daniel Oberhaus, EU Passes Controversial Copyright Law With 'Link Taxes",
MOTHERBOARD (Sept. 12, 2018, 10:54 AM), https://motherboard.vice.com/en-us/article/
bja8wq/eu-passes-controversial-copyright-law-with-link-taxes.
5 Id
6 Id
7 James Vincent & Russell Brandom, Eve thing You Need to Know About Europe's Copyrght
Directive, THE VERGE (Sept. 13, 2018, 2:14 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2018/9/13/
17854158/eu-copyright-directive-article-13-11-internet-censorship-google.
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In response to these and other criticisms, the European Parliament has been
working continuously on amendments and revisions, hoping to calm fears
among critics and rally votes among MEPs. A number of these amendments
were approved on September 12, 2018.8 The next phase will be a series of
dialogues between the European Parliament, the European Commission, and
member states to hammer down the details before the Directive comes up for
final vote in the spring of 2019.9 Part II of this note will discuss Articles 11 and
13, as well as their amendments; the Articles' effects on access to information in
Europe's digital space; and the Articles' potential inconsistency with European
concepts of fundamental rights. Part III will demonstrate that while the
European Union is attempting to establish stronger property rights for creators,
the steps it has taken pose great danger to the concepts of decentralization, access
to information, and freedom of speech - all of which are foundational to the
intemet's origins. Part IV will conclude by arguing that Articles 11 and 13
ultimately disserve the Directive's goals of stimulating the growth and creativity
of digital content.
II. BACKGROUND
The European Copyright Directive was first proposed in 2016.10 What
followed was a frenzy of lobbying efforts from both supporters and critics. Some
of the most vocal proponents of the measure included large content providers
and creators like Paul McCartney, James Blunt, and the International Federation
of the Phonographic Industry (IFPI).11 Content creators contended that the
Directive would fix the "value gap,"1 2 i.e. the difference in monies paid to the
music industry and content creators by services with a license to play the music
- like Spotify and Apple - versus forums where music can be shared and
listened to for free - like YouTube and Facebook.1 3 The reason for this is that
while subscription services like Spotify and Apple Music have less users than
Facebook and YouTube, they bring in substantially more revenue each year.' 4
In 2016, audio subscription services' 212 million users contributed around $3.9
8 Oberhaus, supra note 4.
9 Vincent and Brandom, supra note 7.
1o Scott Roxborough, Paul McCartney, James Blunt Back New European Copyright Law, THE
HOLLYWOOD REPORTER (July 4, 2018), https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/paul-
mccartney-james-blunt-back-new-european-copyright-law-1 124974.
11 Id.
12 Id
13 Global Music Report 2017: Annual State of the Industry, Rewarding Creavity: Fixing the
Value Gap, IFPI, at 25, (2017), http://wwwifpi.org/downloads/GMR2017_ValueGap.pdf.
14 Id.
2019] 277
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billion in revenues to rightsholders.' 5 Compare this with user-uploaded video
services' 900 million users, which contributed only $553 million to rightsholders
in the same year.1 6 Further, Spotify pays content owners around $20 per user,
while YouTube pays content owners less than $1 per user.'7
On the other hand, larger online platforms like Google pushed back against
the Copyright Directive. Google spent over $36 million lobbying European
Members of Parliament (MIEPs) and EU member states.' 8 Platforms like Google
(which owns YouTube) Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter were concerned the
Directive would create large costs in creating content ID and filtration systems
that act before users post.' 9 Not only would the Directive force websites like
YouTube on a similar playing field with other subscription based streaming
services, but the filtration system would block certain user uploaded content,
reducing site traffic.20 Moreover, companies feared that faulty filtration systems
would fail to distinguish between actual copyrighted material and content that
falls within fair use or is not copyrighted at all.21
Google's lobbying efforts were not been limited to traditional tactics,
however. Reports emerged in late 2018 that Google was using a website it funded
to spam MEPs with phone calls, emails, and tweets. 22 According to websites like
The Times 23 and The Trichordist,24 Google funded a Vancouver based company
called OpenMedia.org. 25 According to David Lowery, a professor of music
business at the University of Georgia, OpenMedia encouraged its visitors to
spam politicians with messages supporting policy goals that benefit Google and
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Daniel Sanchez, Google Spent More Than $36 Million to Scuttle Article 13 & the Copyrght
Directive, DIGITALMUsiC NEWS (uly 3,2018), https://www.digitalmusicnews.com/201 8 /07/
03/google-article-13-copyright-directive/.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Vincent and Brandom, supra note 7.
22 Chris Cooke, As Copyright Directive Campaigning Starts up Again, Article Thirteen Opponents
Plan to Take to the Streets, CMU (Aug. 17, 2018), http://www.completemusicupdate.com/
article/as-copyright-directive-campaigning-starts-up-again-article-thirteen-opponents-plan-
to-take-to-the-streets/.
23 Matthew Moore, Googe Funds Website that Spams For Its Causes, The Times (Aug. 6, 2018),
https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/google-funds-activist-site-that-pushes-its-views-
rg2g5cr6t.
24 David Lowery, The Google Funded Astroturf Group that Hacked The EU Coprght Vote (In
Pictures), The Trichordist (July 28, 2018), https://thetrichordist.com/2018/07/28/the-google-
funded-astroturf-group-that-hacked-the-eu-copyright-vote-in-pictures/.
25 Id.
[Vol. 26:2278
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others in Silicon Valley.26 While the tactics did not crush the passage of the
Copyright Directive entirely, amendments to Articles 11 and 13 did follow.
So what do Articles 11 and 13 say? First, Article 11 concerns the protection
of press publications in the digital age. In amended form, it provides that
"publishers of press publications" have the right to "obtain fair and
proportionate remuneration for the digital use of their press publications by
information society service providers." 27 This language is what critics have
referred to as the "link tax", which requires online platforms to pay fees to news
outlets and other content creators for the news shared on their sites.28 However,
part of the amendments to Article 11 included the addition of language which
reduced its scope. Specifically, this included the following language: "The rights
referred to in paragraph 1 shall not prevent legitimate private and noncommercial
use of press publications by individual users."29 The amendments further
clarified that, "[t]he rights referred to in paragraph 1 shall not extend to mere
hyperlinks which are accompanied by individual words." 30 These amendments
assuaged some critics' fears and rallied support for the Copyright Directive in
European Parliament. Others retorted that the amendments' vague language
simply created new problems.31
Article 13 concerns the "[u]se of protected content by online content sharing
service providers storing and giving access to large amounts of works and other
subject-matter uploaded by their users." 32 Its purpose is essentially to prevent
the unlicensed sharing of protected content on the internet. So, if a user shared
a copyright protected song on YouTube without first licensing it, YouTube
would be liable. In the Directive's original draft, Article 13 provided that not only
would content sharing websites like Facebook or YouTube be liable for their
users' unlicensed posts, but also that they would have a burden to actively
monitor posts with tools like "content recognition technologies." 33
However, after pushback from critics, adjustments were made to omit this
language. As a solution, Article 13 now stipulates that "[m]ember states" shall
require (1) websites to negotiate licensing agreements with rightsholders to
compensate for user posts; or (2) where parties cannot agree on licensing
agreements, that websites and rightsholders work together to "ensure that
26 Id.
27 Amendment Adopted by the European Parkament on 12 Sept. 2018, Proposalfor a Directive of the
European Parliament and of the Council on Copynght in the Digital Single Market, COM(2016) 593)
[hereinafter Amendments].
28 Id
2 Id. at 54.
3 Id.
31 Vincent and Brandom, supra note 7.
32 Amendments, supra note 27, at 56.
33 Directive, supra note 1, at 29.
2019] 279
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unauthorized protected works... are not available on their services." 34 This
language is far more relaxed than requiring the use of "content recognition
technologies, but Article 13's new language still provides that websites work to
monitor user uploads. And because the language charges individual EU member
states with the responsibility of implementing guidance for websites and
rightsholders in each state, there is nothing stopping the individual states from
mandating the use of content recognition technologies.
The amendments to Article 13 further seek to relieve detractors' fears by
addressing, almost directly, the concerns raised in Vint Cerf and Tim Berners-
Lee's letter.35 One of those worries being that content ID technology would
misidentify posts, blocking non-protected or fair use content.36 In response,
Article 13 now commands member states to guarantee that online service
providers have methods available to rectify any false-positives in the copyright
protection process, including human review.37 This solution seems to imply that
the EU still envisions content recognition technology as the primary method for
protecting copyrights online. If not, mandating human review would seem
redundant. Furthermore, the amendments recognize the "internet pioneers"'
anxiety over increased surveillance online. Section 2(b) of Article 13 in its
amended state provides that both rightsholders and online service providers shall
implement all protection schemes "in accordance with Directive 95/46/EC,
Directive 2002/58/EC and the General Data Protection Regulation" and "the
cooperation shall not lead to any identification of individual users nor the
processing of their personal data." 38
III. ANALYSIS
Articles 11 and 13 pose great danger to the concepts of decentralization,
access to information, and freedom of speech - all of which are foundational
to the internet's origins. This criticism is not solely rooted in practical experience
and understanding of the internet; rather, the articles undermine important policy
goals of copyright law. Consider, for example, the concept of "market
hierarchy," 39 which is Professor Neil Netanel's expansion on the idea of
"crowding out," 40 popularized by Professors Melville Nimmer and Paul
34 Amendments, supra note 27, at 57.
35 Letter from Vint Cerf et al. to Antonio Tajani, supra note 2.
36 Id.
37 Amendments, supra note 27, at 57.
38 Id. at 58.
39 Neil W. Netanel, Market Hierarchy and Coyeright in Our System of Free Expression, 53 VAND.
L. REV. 1879 (2000).
40 See David McGowan, Wh~y the First Amendment Cannot Dictate Copyrght Polig, 65 U. PITr.
L. REv. 281, 287 (2003) (stating "Professor Nimmer thought some expression could not be
[Vol. 26:2280
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Goldstein. For Netanel, conditions of wealth inequality in the market place can
lead to "speech hierarchy" which is,
the disproportionate power of wealthy speakers and audiences to
determine the mix of speech that comprises our public discourse.
By effectively silencing outlying minorities and the poor... [i]t
produces a mix of speech that neither encompasses a wide,
representative spectrum of viewpoint nor carries the voices of
diverse and antagonistic sources. 41
These ideas of crowding out and "speech hierarchy" play an important role in
the debate over the Copyright Directive. Lay critics have noted concerns that
giving copyright owners more protection will come at a cost to average
consumers of the internet and restrict access to information on it.42 Professor
Netanel has expressed these concerns as two-fold. First, that where rightsholders
are given too much control, they may suppress the ability of users to access,
share, or express protected content. Essentially, "copyright expansion ...
constitutes an unprecedented ability to control the deployment of existing
expression." 43 Second, such a level of domination by rightsholders could result in
the reduction of ideas expressed across the public sphere.44
A. ARTICLE 11
Article 11 of the Copyright Directive, even in its amended form, has the
potential to do precisely what professors like Nimmer and Netanel fear. Article
11 would require commercial websites to pay a "link tax" for news articles shared
on their sites. Essentially, news articles or stories owned by "publishers of press
publications" would be protected so that any time they were shared on the
internet, the sharer of that story would be required to remunerate the publisher
of that information. In a world where a significant portion of news is spread
electronically, and especially over platforms like Facebook and Twitter, the
effects of Article 11 could be widespread and detrimental. According to a study
done by the Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism at the University of
Oxford, nearly 36% of people polled in twelve countries in 2018 used Facebook
separated from its idea and was too important to risk being 'censored' by the rights-holder,"
and "Professor Goldstein worried both about the scope of copyright and the accumulation of
rights by large media firms").
41 Netanel, supra note 40, at 1884.
42 Oberhaus, supra note 4.
43 Neil W. Netanel, Copyight and a Democratic CivilSoely, 106 Yale L.J. 283, 362 (1996).
44 McGowan, supra note 41, at 289-90 (summarizing Netanel's view of copyright law on
civil society).
2019]1 281
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for news within a week of the poll.45 This was compared with 11 % for Twitter,
6% for Instagram, and 3% for Snapchat.46 And those numbers ignore sites like
YouTube or Reddit, of which, 18% and 4% of their users go to for news.47 With
tighter control on news product, access to news would decrease and the social
dialogue in Europe would decline.
The link tax would certainly cost large companies like Facebook, Twitter, or
Google millions of dollars if they were required to cover costs for every news
article shared on their platforms. A likely outcome may be that large sites simply
pass the cost of news onto their users through fees or simply reduce the news
content available. For example, in 2014, Spain implemented a similar tax on news
aggregators: platforms like Google News, Flipboard, and Reddit.48 The Spanish
tax was mandatory for all news aggregators and publishers of news could not opt
out.49 In reaction to the law, Google News voluntarily shut down in Spain,
50
leaving online consumers to get their news elsewhere. And while larger platforms
like Google News could sustain such a tax, smaller news aggregators were unable
to afford such fees - closing down entirely.5
In addition to costing news aggregators money, the Spanish tax was
counterproductive for publishers. Because aggregators shut down, news
publishers lost between ten and fifteen percent of web traffic. 52 Furthermore,
because publishers could not opt out of the law, news aggregators refused to pay
the tax to include news from smaller publishers on their platforms, causing those
smaller news outlets to lose a more significant amount of traffic. 53 This would
indicate that publishers' interests are actually in line with those of platforms that
share their published news. In fact, a study commissioned by Spanish publishers
found that news aggregators have a "Market Expansion Effect" - "[a]ggregation
services reduce search times, which allows readers to consume more news. This
45 Nic Newman et al. , DigitalNews Report 2018, REUTERS INST. 1, 11 (2018), http://
media.digitalnewsreport.org/wp-content/uploads/ 2 0 18/06/digital-news-report-
2018.pdPx89475.
46 Id. at 11.
47 Elisa Shearer & Jeffrey Gottfried, News Use Across Social Media Plaforms 2017, PEW
RESEARCH CTR. (Sept. 17, 2017), http://www.journalism.org/2017/09/07/news-use-across-
social-media-platforms-2017/.
48 Joe Mullin, New stuy shows Spain's "Google tax" has been a disaster for pubshers, ARS
TECHNICA (July 30, 2015, 5:04 PM) https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2015/ 0 7/new-
study-shows-spains-google-tax-has-been-a-disaster-for-publishers/.
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 Id
52 Mathew Ingram, External traffic to Spanish news sites plummets after Google move, GIGAOM
(Dec. 16, 2014, 10:32 AM), https://gigaom.com/2014/12/16/traffic-to-spanish-news-
publishers-plummets-after-google-move/.
s3 Mullin, supra note 50.
[Vol. 26:2282
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not only increases the total number of site visits, but increases the audience of
less popular news outlets that otherwise would not have received attention." 54
Following the logic in the NERA study, the link tax in Article 11 would be
counterproductive to the goals of the Copyright Directive and copyright
principles in general. The link tax would financially burden news aggregators at
a cost to consumers of news. Further, it is contrary to the interests of publishers.
Large and small publishers alike would lose an avenue of access to their websites,
which as a whole would reduce the very profits that Article 11 is attempting to
protect.
The damage that Article 11 could do to speech and the spread of information
online is not limited to large platforms like Google or Facebook. Despite its
amended language, Article 11 still threatens smaller platforms and sharers of
online news. The added language to Article 11 for "legitimate private and
noncommercial use of press publications by individual users"55 could exempt
specific users of the internet from the link tax. If users were simply sharing an
article or piece of news for no other purpose than to spread information, they
could be exempt. However, one problem for the drafters of the amendment is
that there is no average user of the internet. News and information sharing
occurs in many different forms across the internet. For a law that is supposed to
apply to the entire internet, Article 11 does little to define types of "private and
noncommercial use." Questions arise from this added language. Would the link
tax apply to news aggregators, to blogs, or RSS feeds? Would the size of one's
online following determine that site or post's level of commercialism? Would
nonprofits or NGOs sharing news relevant to their mission be included?
The reality is that very little on the internet is "private and noncommercial."
While personal blogs, YouTube pages, and other social media accounts may be
private and noncommercial in that they belong to an individual or small group
whose primary goal is not profit-seeking, the structure for ad revenue on the
internet could mean that any site with ads is commercial. Without a concrete
definition of private and noncommercial use, individual member states could
enforce the link tax inconsistently across Europe, creating a disparity between
EU members' access to information and news, while also, creating a disparity
between the types of news shared in different EU countries.
Finally, it is unclear whether the exception supplied for "mere hyperlinks" in
Article 11's amended form would alleviate the suppression the link tax causes to
individuals attempting to share news. The amended language provides that press
publishers' rights to "fair and proportionate remuneration" do not apply to
54 NERA EcoNONUc CONSULTING, Impacto del Nuevo Articulo 32.2 de la Lg de Propiedad
Intelectualat x (July 9, 2015), https://www.aeepp.com/pdf/InformeNera.pdf.
ss Amendments, supra note 27, at 54.
2019] 283
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"mere hyperlinks which are accompanied by individual words."5 6 This language
was added in response to critics and in line with a nonbinding opinion from the
Advocate General of the European Court of Justice. The Advocate General's
opinion from 2016 noted that while "each act of communication of a work to
the public has to be authorized [sic] by the copyright holder... hyperlinks which
are placed on a website and which link to protected works that are freely
accessible on another site cannot be classified as an 'act of communication.'"
57
While the amended language allows for "mere hyperlinks which are
accompanied by individual words,"58 it is unclear the extent to which it applies.
The meaning of "individual words" is not defined. Yet, the number of words
and detail allowed to accompany a hyperlink is critical. In an age where much of
the public discourse occurs online, access to published news is essential to
informed debate. The interpretation of "individual words" could be detrimental
to the expression and summation of ideas surrounding published and
copyrighted material online. At best, the vague language could be implemented
asymmetrically across Europe. At worst, the language could be read narrowly to
prohibit anything but the most minimal description to accompany a hyperlink.
The latter construction would not only limit the hyperlinks function, but also
limit the freedom of individual users to express their opinions regarding the
information those hyperlinks store. Hyperlinks are useful in that they provide a
shortcut to an article. But a consumer or reader is less likely to click on that
hyperlink if he has no context for where it leads. Further, hyperlinks with
accompanying words are ubiquitous on the internet - found everywhere from
social media and blogs to online encyclopedias (Wikipedia) and copyrighted news
articles. Accompanying words often express opinions about or describe content
found within the hyperlink. Better, evidence shows that hyperlinks give
credibility to the person using them and promote the reader's desire to seek more
information on a given topic - similar to citing sources in academia.5 ' If words
suddenly could not compliment hyperlinks then expression, description, and
citation to copyrighted material would decrease significantly. Not only would
informed public discourse suffer, but also, similar to Spain's link tax study, so
would the very publishers whom Article 11 is attempting to protect.
56 Id.
57 Court of Justice of the European Union Press Release No 37/16, Advocate General's
Opinion in Case C-160/15 (April 7, 2016).
58 Amendments, supra note 27, at 54.
59 See generally Porismita Borah, The Hyperlinked World: A Lok at How the Interactions of News
Frames and Hyperlinks Influence News Credibiliy and Wilngness to Seek Information*, 19 J. OF
COMPUTER-MEDIATED Comm. 576 (2014).
[Vol. 26:2284
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B. ARTICLE 13
Similar concerns plague Article 13 as Article 11, despite significant
amendment to Article 13's original form. Critics' primary issue with Article 13
stemmed from its use of Content ID technologies and upload filters.60 As noted
previously, the language of Article 13 has been redrafted to omit the use of
phrases like "content recognition technology". However, Article 13 still silently
relies on the use of such methods and technology, as implied by the mention that
such "mechanisms shall be processed without undue delay and be subject to
human review."61 Amended Article 13 envisions first that online service
providers work directly with rightsholders to license the works that may be
- shared online. If this fails, Article 13 requires EU member states to ensure that
online content sharing services provide for mechanisms to prevent the sharing
of copyrighted work without proper licensing. 62 For the Directive's drafters,
these mechanisms would preferably be content recognition technology subject
to human review.63
Because individual EU member states will be charged with enforcing Article
13, critics fears are sustained. There is nothing to stop a member state from
requiring the use of content recognition technology or worse, upload filters.
Upload filters are a subset of content recognition technology, the primary
distinguisher is that upload filters act prior to a user sharing content, rather than
identifying the protected content after it has been posted.64 Whether the shared
content is blocked before or after posting, if the content is not protected or is
fair use, the result is the same - censorship.
Content recognition technology is problematic because it does not often
work. Critics point to YouTube's content ID system, which is known for over-
blocking fair use and non-protected content.65 Users' posts could be blocked for
posting any of the following. videos with copyrighted songs in the background,
or pictures with a copyrighted band poster in the background, or snippets of a
copyrighted book in a social media post, even parodies or memes. 66 Content
recognition technology would be especially troublesome for online user-
contributed encyclopedias, like Wikipedia. Everything from pictures to book
6o Vincent and Brandom, supra note 7.
61 Amendments, sffpra note 27, at 57.
62 Id.
63 Id.
6 Vincent and Brandom, supra note 7.
6s Cory Doctorow, The EUs Copyight Proposal is Extremey Bad News for Everyone, Even
(Especialy!) Wikeedia, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (June 7, 2018), https://www.eff.org/
deeplinks/2018/06/eus-copyright-proposal-extremely-bad-news-everyone-even-especially-
wikipedia.
66 Id.
2019] 285
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quotes, all important parts of the user-driven encyclopedia, could be blocked
because of overprotection, despite fair use. 67 The bad outcomes are as wide as
the internet itself and relying on an automated tool that errs toward
overprotection would lead to the exact outcomes that Professors Nimmer and
Netanel feared. Article 13 would drive up the cost of sharing content or
expressing ideas online. If the automated technology blocked a user's post, that
user would be forced to choose between what may be a costly appeal to the
online service provider and the rightsholder or simply concede the post to be
blocked. Worse, users who feared that their shared or original content,
incorporating fair use material, would be blocked, may simply decide not to post
online. Overall, this would decrease creative expression online.
The failures of content ID technology are not limited to false positives. Since
YouTube's implementation of its content ID system, trolls and angry
rightsholders have used the system to take advantage of innocent posters. For
example, in 2012 BMG (owned by Sony) took down a Mitt Romney ad showing
President Obama singing "Let's Stay Together" by Al Green, despite fair use
claims. 68 The trend to make false claims over copyright infringement is growing
in the U.S. For example, groups now exist to target noncommercial infringers,
threatening frivolous litigation and extracting settlements.6
9
Furthermore, content recognition technology is expensive. Google spent
over $60 million developing YouTube's content ID system.70 Unlike companies
like Google or Facebook, smaller websites do not have the ability to spend $60
million developing a content recognition algorithm specific to their site. Similar
to the case study in Spain, this content recognition mechanism requirement could
drive smaller content sharing platforms out of business, leaving only the existing
large sites to dominate the market. Tim Berners-Lee has called this phenomenon
the "balkanized web".7 1 The central worry is that as larger platforms gain more
control over the online space, not only will these companies gain more financial
power and control over their consumers but the number and diversity of ideas
and expression will decrease. With power centralized in large internet companies,
select platforms have more control over the ideas shared and the cost of sharing,
67 Id.
68 Cory Doctorow, Europe's New Copynght Rules Are Like YouTube's Content ID System-for the
Entire Internet, MOTHERBOARD (June 14, 2018, 11:16 AM), https://motherboard.vice.com
/en us/article/mbk47b/europe-copyright-rules-content-id.
69 Copyright Trolls, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/issues/copyright-trolls
(last visited Apr. 2, 2019).
70 How Google Fights Pirag, GoOGLE, at 6 (2016), https://drive.google.com/file/d/
OBwxyRPFduTN2cl91LXJOYjlYSjA/view.
71 Liat Clark, Tim Berners-Lee: We need to re-decentraliZe the Web, ARSTECHNICA (Feb. 6, 2014,
11:08 AM), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/02/tim-berners-lee-we-need-to-re-
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which reduces the potential for users to be exposed to diverse ideas or be able
or allowed to share their own expressions. Thus, Article 13 is counterproductive
to copyright goals because it diminishes the potential for new expression and
reduces the audience size for protected work by limiting the number of platforms
where protected work can be accessed.
Finally, content recognition technology and other methods for monitoring
content sharing websites risk creating an atmosphere of surveillance on the web.
Critics fear that holding online platforms liable for the sharing of protected
content would lead platforms to constantly surveil their users. Further, users'
information and online data may be exposed to rightsholders in the enforcement
process. Notably, the EU amended Article 13 to require that enforcement
mechanisms be implemented "in accordance with Directive 95/46/EC,
Directive 2002/58/EC and the General Data Protection Regulation" and "the
cooperation shall not lead to any identification of individual users nor the
processing of their personal data." 72 But this amendment does not completely
eliminate privacy concerns. If Article 13 further centralized the internet, as Tim
Berners-Lee fears, large intemet companies as well as EU member countries
would have access to greater amounts of users' personal data. An internet
composed of a few large companies equipped with content recognition
technology would normalize automated surveillance.
72 Amendments, supra note 27, at 58.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Whatever mechanisms member states require to implement Articles 11 and
13, there will be conflicts with the European Union's Charter of Fundamental
Rights.73 As this note has explained, the Articles' overreaching copyright
protections will weaken online platforms' ability to do business cheaply, curb
internet users' ability and willingness to share information or expression, and
encroach on internet users' privacy rights in the online space. Not only do the
Articles have negative policy outcomes, but they are also likely illegal. The EU's
Charter of Fundamental Rights provides for rights to copyright,74 to conduct
business, 75to be secure in personal data,76 and to expression and information.77
And as the Court of Justice of the European Union has explained regarding
implementation of EU directives, "Member States must not only interpret their
national law in a manner consistent with those directives but also make sure that
they do not rely on an interpretation of them which would be in conflict with
those fundamental rights." 78 Member states will be charged with the difficult task
of balancing the Copyright Directive with the Charter of Fundamental Rights.
Ultimately, the European Union's attempt to establish stronger property
rights for creators will have negative legal and policy implications. Articles 11 and
13 are inconsistent with current principles mandated by the EU's Charter of
Fundamental Rights. And, the Articles pose great danger to the concepts of
decentralization, privacy, access to information, and freedom of speech - all of
which are foundational to the internet's origins. But worst of all, the Articles'
effects will be counterproductive to the Directive's goal - "stimulat[ing]
innovation, creativity, investment and production of new content, [] in the digital
environment."79
73 See generaly Dr. Reto M. Hilty & Dr. Valentina Moscon, Contributions by the Max Planck
Institute for Innovation and Competition in response to the questions raised bj the authorities of Belgum, the
Czech Republic, Finland, Hungary, Ireland and the Netherlands to the Council Legal Service regarding
Article 13 and Recital 38 of the Proposalfor a Directive on Copyrzght in the Digital Single Market, MAX
PLANCK INST. FOR INNOVATION AND COMPETITION, at 4 (2017), https://www.ip.mpg.de/
fileadmin/impg/content/stellungnahmen/AnswersArticle_13_2017-HiltyMoscon-rev_1
8_19.pdf.
74 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,art. 17(2), 2012 O.J. (C 326) 2.
75 Id. art. 16.
76 Id. art. 8.
77 Id. art. 11.
78 Case C-275/06, Productores de Musica de Espafia (Promusicae) v Telef6nica de Espafia
SAU, 2008 E.L.R. 1-00271.
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